

HEGEMONIC AND OTHER MASCULINITIES IN LOCAL SOCIAL CONTEXTS

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This paper is a theoretical examination of Connell's social theory of gender, discussing how the hegemonic, complicit, subordinate, and marginalized masculinities interact and relate to one another in the everyday lives of people in particular social contexts. Presently, Connell's theory is articulated in global terms that need to be localised in order to examine the actual interactions of men (and women) with one another. The theory implies a multi-level framework that we develop more explicitly. We investigate two interrelated theoretical concerns: [1] inadequately detailed interdependencies between structural, individual and cultural factors with respect to masculinities, and [2] the lack of contextualisation of masculinities in specific relational settings. In our view, both of these issues contribute to the difficulty of adequately examining gender relations in local settings. We suggest that theoretical insights gained from social network theory and analysis, permitting the simultaneous investigation of both the social relations between individuals and their individual attributes, allow such issues to be addressed and ultimately assist us in a local-level account of gendered power relations. We conclude with a specification of Connell's theory into particular, testable hypotheses for use with statistical models for social networks.

Introduction

Connell's social theory of gender (Carrigan, Connell, & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987, 1995, 2002a; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) emphasises the relations of power between men and women, and also between different groups of men. It asserts that gender is structured relationally and hierarchically, and consists of multiple masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinity, the most popular aspect of Connell's theory, is "defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Hegemonic masculinity controls a hierarchy of masculinities set up in a way to maintain these gender relations. So hegemonic masculinity has dominance not just over women, but also over subordinate masculinities, such as gay or academically inclined. Current strategies for male domination of women indicate that gay males are targeted because of their association with feminine behaviour (by stereotyped beliefs such as lacking toughness, being gentle and caring, demonstrating an interest in clothes and general appearance, sexual receptivity, etc.....), therefore strongly asserting hegemonic masculinity as heterosexual. Likewise, academically achieving boys/men represent the cerebral and sedentary, the passivity of femininity, in contrast to the physicality and activity of masculinity. Demetriou makes the observation that "Connell's originality lies in the formulation of a single theoretical principle that states that *the relationships within genders are centered on, and can be explained by, the relationships between genders*" (Demetriou, 2001, p.343: emphasis in original).

In using the term *hegemony*, Connell asserts that culturally constructed relations are presented to appear natural to justify present social positions. Thus, there are prevailing beliefs which accept and perpetuate current gender relations. Central to the theory is the use of ideology, which Connell states to be an "ideology of supremacy" of men over women (Connell, 1995, p.83). Violence also has a role in the dominance by men. "A structure of inequality on this scale, involving a massive dispossession of social resources, is hard to imagine without violence. It is, overwhelmingly, the dominant gender who hold and use the means of violence" (Connell, 1995, p. 83). Connell recognises the need to be both global and local in theorizing about gender. Connell's relational theory is presented within a macro sociological framework which is complemented with fine-detailed *life histories* of men. These ethnographic accounts provide rich qualitative descriptions that explore gender in the context of real men's lives, giving micro level detail to complement macro structural relations.

It is not surprising that debate continues around Connell's theory given its wide scope. Demetriou (2001) articulates theoretical inconsistencies and suggests that the hegemonic form should have more interaction and negotiation with other masculinities rather than being seen in purely dominative terms, more in line with Gramsci's conception of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). This point is further developed by Howson (2005) who suggests that hegemonic masculinity needs to be redefined to incorporate leading but non-dominative forms of masculinity. Other researchers suggest that Connell's theory is insufficient to understand how men negotiate their masculinity and that the theory is "mainly concerned with categorizing groups of men into types dependent on their shared collective positioning in relation to gendered practices" (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 337). Questions have been raised about the psychology underlying men's embodiment of masculinity, hinting at an absence of the personal detail of how men's and boys' lives link into the macro structures that Connell outlines (Jefferson, 2002; Wetherell

& Edley, 1999). “What is missing is more fine-grain work on what complicity and resistance look like in practice” (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 337) because Connell does not articulate how the differing configurations of masculinity identified in the theory “actually prescribe or regulate men’s lives” (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p.336). Whitehead (2002) suggests that Connell’s hegemonic masculinity fails to incorporate agency, and is therefore structurally reductive to an immovable male dominance, and echoes the call for an explanation of the “everyday social interaction” of people’s gendered being (Whitehead, 1999, p. 58). Hearn (2004) raises a number of issues regarding hegemonic masculinity, but is primarily concerned with whether the concept refers to “cultural representations, everyday practices or institutional structures” (Hearn, 2004, p. 58). Such concerns have encouraged an extended rethinking of the concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).

It is notable that critiques do not undermine the fundamental tenets of the theory which state the “plurality” and “hierarchy of masculinities” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 846), but rather seek to elaborate and expand the details. This indicates that although the theory is intact, difficult and unresolved theoretical issues remain for Connell’s masculinities. It is necessary to make sense of some of these difficulties and we endeavour to do this in a way that will permit a quantitative empirical examination of the structural relations that underpin Connell’s theory within particular social contexts. To achieve this it is useful to view the theory through the lens of social network analysis, a relational methodology designed to examine the interactions *between* individuals, as well as personal level attributes, within a particular context.

Currently an examination of interpersonal relations in local settings is limited by a lack of specification in the theory. To this end, we focus on two theoretical issues. Firstly, how best to conceptualise hegemonic masculinity is a recurring theme in much of the critique of Connell’s theory (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Demetriou, 2001; Donaldson, 1993; Hearn, 2004; Howson, 2005; Jefferson, 2002; Speer, 2001a, 2001b; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Whitehead, 1999, 2002). Hegemonic masculinity is a multilevel concept operating at local, regional and global levels which also simultaneously engages cultural, individual and structural factors. Further, these cultural, individual, and structural components are interdependent. However, previous methodological and theoretical interpretations often assert the primacy of one of these three to the exclusion of the others, and it is often the structural components that are understated. The problem lies primarily in the fact that the interdependency between structures, individuals and culture has not been explicitly expressed theoretically.

Secondly, and related to the first point, Connell notes the importance of context in general theoretical terms and in qualitative investigation of masculinities, but the conceptualisation of local social context has insufficient detail for our purposes. By using life history techniques, Connell refers to the temporal context of an individual, the personal context, but there are other ways of positing context. Specifically, we are interested in the interactions and gendered expressions of a number of individuals with one another in particular local settings. Both of these theoretical issues hinder the connection of the macrostructures implied by the theory with the micro details of individual people’s lives. We begin with a review of current interpretations of Connell’s theory to demonstrate our concerns with these interrelated theoretical issues.

Is hegemonic masculinity a social relation, an individual attribute or a cultural phenomenon?

The conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity opens complex issues.

I emphasise that terms such as 'hegemonic masculinity' and 'marginalised masculinities' name not fixed character types but configurations of practice generated in particular situations in a changing structure of relationships. Any theory of masculinity worth having must give an account of this process of change. (Connell, 1995, p. 81)

Connell's social theory emphasises that gender is fundamentally relational and argues that hegemonic masculinity cannot be defined *a priori* as a set of psychological traits or predetermined characteristics (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Hegemonic masculinity exists only *in relation* to subordinate, complicit and marginalized masculinities but it is often asserted in a non-relational (or not explicitly relational) way as a quality that resides within the individual. Within such a perspective, Connell's theory is sometimes utilised as a set of individual level variables or psychological traits, leading to the criticism that hegemonic masculinity has the tendency to be used attributionally (Collier, 1998; Connell, 2002b; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Jefferson, 2002). For instance, Kupers (2005) focuses on the destructive or "toxic" qualities of hegemonic masculinity that are dangerous to men's health, indicating that hegemonic masculinity acts as a barrier to mental health treatment in prisons. The notion that gender is a set of power relations between men and women, and between groups of men, is absent. Many researchers do attempt to go beyond the individual and discuss the power relations and cultural ideals related to hegemonic masculinity (for instance, see Kenway & Fitzclarence, 1997). But it may not always be easy for researchers and readers alike, who are used to envisaging gender as a set of personal qualities, to engage gender instead as a set of power relations and dismiss the 'psychological attribute' angle of gender. Further, "pop psychology" predilections for "the invention of new character types" such as "the alpha male, the sensitive new-age guy, the hairy man, the new lad, the "rat boy", etc..." (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 840) push the perspective that gender is internalised, not relational to others. Social structures and relations become lost. For example, concepts such as power and independence are promoted as attributes of hegemonic masculinity that reside within the individual, when both terms are better understood as relating to social relations *between* individuals. It is therefore no surprise that Connell is keen to refute such purely psychological perspectives because they disregard the strength of the theory - that gender is a set of power relations that are dynamic and historically contextualised. Psychological perspectives do not notice this concern because in the main their proponents appear content to see structure in terms of individual differences.

In contrast, other perspectives attempt to engage the relational side of Connell's theory. Kilduff and Mehra (1996) examined the social relations of power and admiration between men and women in an MBA course using social network analysis techniques. The examination of micro level social relations permits a move from the group to individual relations. The research found differences between the way men and women *network* (or interact) with one another, suggesting that men occupied more central and powerful positions in social networks, with such positioning admired by some men. This was seen as evidence supporting the concept of hegemonic masculinity. However, in this study, apart from gender categorisation, there are only structural data, and in particular there are no individual level data on the personal qualities of these individuals, and how individuals might perceive masculinity and femininity. This research is in clear contrast to purely psychological perspectives. On a theoretical level, however, Kilduff's (2001) discussion of the effects of hegemonic masculinity on organisations shows awareness of

how individuals and individual factors may provide an insightful structural and cultural analysis of organisations.

Demetriou (2001) argues against the attribution of fixed personal qualities to hegemonic masculinity, stressing instead the fluidity and historical contextuality of hegemonic masculinity which is not reducible to a psychological trait. Hegemonic masculinity might reproduce itself by evolving into what might be seen as a 'new' masculinity, but still maintain a dominant position over other masculinities (Demetriou, 2001). In such a way the specific qualities attributed to masculinity and femininity at a particular point in time may change without necessarily a change occurring in the gendered relations of power. Demetriou's (2001) argument emphasises that hegemonic masculinity encompasses both power relational components *and* personal or attributional qualities. Nevertheless, Demetriou suggests that structures and attributes are not necessarily related. For Whitehead (2002) this fluidity of personal characteristics and detachment from social structures is problematic, suggesting that the "fundamental inconsistency in the term hegemonic masculinity" is that "its primary underpinning is the notion of a fixed (male) structure" (Whitehead, 2002, pp. 93-94). In discussing hegemony as the constant struggle for power that never becomes a totality, Whitehead argues that "hegemonic masculinity disabuses this possibility, not least because its very fluidity signals its 'ability' to be any male practice, anywhere, anytime. Following this interpretation, hegemonic masculinity will always be with us; it can never be overcome" (Whitehead, 2002, p. 94). Even though Connell indicates dissatisfaction with purely structuralist perspectives, as evidenced by critique of sex role theory (Carrigan et al., 1985; Connell, 1995), Whitehead argues that hegemonic masculinity sets up a "structure-agency dualism" (Whitehead, 2002, p. 94) and indicates that Connell's theory is structurally deterministic.

The problem with the psychological perspective is easy to see. Individualising structure is not particularly useful for a theory that is inherently relational. On the other hand, suggesting that the theory is only structural runs into the criticism that hegemonic masculinity is insurmountable and will always be present because it can take on any qualities without structural change. Yet both of these perspectives provide important benefits. Beliefs and attitudes are certainly important, as are relations of power between individuals. Nevertheless, because neither perspective is clear about how individual qualities and social relations go together, we are left in the gap between social structures and personal attributes.

However, recent poststructuralist techniques that push a more eclectic barrow and attempt to locate hegemonic masculinity in discursive terms are seen as a possible means to connect the individual into society (Whitehead, 2002). Such techniques may "provide means by which to interpret, understand and locate the subject in the social network, in the process providing insights into (non-grounded) identity, the self, power/resistance and subjectivity" (Whitehead, 2002, p. 103). Such work has resulted in considerable criticism of hegemonic masculinity and focused on cultural perspectives of the concept.

Hegemonic masculinity is not a personality type or an actual male character. Rather, it is an ideal or set of prescriptive social norms, symbolically represented, but a crucial part of the texture of many routine and disciplinary activities. The exact content of the prescriptive mundane social norms which make up hegemonic masculinity is left unclear. (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p.336)

Speer asserts that "the concept of hegemonic masculinity is, by its very nature, an abstract, 'uncapturable' yardstick, used to describe something that extends beyond local practices and actions" (Speer, 2001a, p. 142).

Hegemonic masculinity is presented in Connell's work as an aspirational goal rather than as a lived reality for ordinary men. Indeed, a key characteristic seems to be its 'impossibility' or 'fantastic' nature.....As social psychologists, however, we wonder about the appropriateness of a definition of dominant masculinity which no man may ever actually embody. (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p.337)

Connell adds weight to this perception that hegemonic masculinity is a cultural ideal by making reference to "the culturally exalted form of masculinity" and indicating that there is "a distance, and a tension, between collective ideal and actual lives" (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 592). Additionally, Gramsci's (1971) emphasis on culture is perhaps another reason why hegemonic masculinity is popularly seen as a cultural ideal. However, Connell (2001; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) rejects interpreting hegemonic masculinity as *only* a cultural ideal because the concept is "multidimensional" and is "intended to refer to patterns of practice and political relations in historical context, with cultural definitions of identity providing just one dimension of these patterns" (Connell, 2001, pp. 7-8). Perhaps because of the inability to locate individual practices within social structural relations, the focus moves to the cultural aspects of hegemonic masculinity. Both Wetherell and Edley (1999) and Speer (2001b) are correct in asserting that cultural aspects are important for hegemonic masculinity and may serve to alter individual performances of gender. But it is not appropriate to limit hegemonic masculinity to cultural factors alone.

All of the above arguments make a significant contribution to an understanding of hegemonic masculinity. But each perspective tells only a part of the story. Theoretically, Connell indicates that social structures, cultural factors and individual level attributes are *all* critical to an understanding of gender. Connell's multidisciplinary theoretical synthesis is proof of this, presenting varying bodies of knowledge on gender, including, but not limited to, sociology, psychology, history, and anthropology. Beyond this however it is necessary to propose precisely how structural, individual and cultural factors are *interdependent* with one another. Interdependency refers to "the influence that cultural and societal formations have upon social actors and the transformative impact that social actors, for their own part, have upon cultural and societal structures" (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1442). A key point is that "social structure, culture and human agency presuppose one another" (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1413). Interdependency implicates the active negotiation of an individual's embodiment of gender in change and in redefining cultural ideals and social structures. To say otherwise takes away the local level agency of individuals to negotiate their own gendered selves. Connell makes reference to interdependency with respect to gender by suggesting that "hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power" (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Additionally, Connell also indicates interdependency between the multi levels of the theory, stating that "links between these levels exist"(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849). These links are bidirectional such that "schools do not just receive gender patterns from the wider society, they are actively involved in constructing gender" (Connell, 2004, p. 18). Therefore, there are two types of interdependencies in Connell's theory. There is interdependency of level (local, regional, and global) and interdependency of factors or components (structural, individual, and cultural). Limited specification of both types of these interdependencies is central to the difficulties of those grappling with the concept of hegemonic masculinity.

The disconnection between macro and micro highlights the need to address the issue of interdependency. "Hegemonic masculinity is a term of *generalization* and *generalizations*, although useful for helping understand big picture accounts, can be problematic for understanding the constitution

of individual subjectivities” (Pringle, 2005, p. 267, emphasis in original).

What hegemonic masculinity does so effectively is exemplify, at a macrostructural level, a masculinist ethos that privileges what have traditionally been seen as natural male traits. One could proceed to describe this in terms of a dominant ideology of masculinism: an ideology which seeks to sanction the cultural boundaries of ‘masculine behaviour’ while ‘naturalizing’ the sex/gender categories of man/woman. But it still leaves us wondering what is going on for these men, and women, as individuals/subjects. For the concept of hegemonic masculinity goes little way towards revealing the complex patterns of inculcation and resistance which constitute everyday social interaction. (Whitehead, 1999, p. 58)

The concerns of Pringle (2005) and Whitehead (1999) suggest a difficulty of locating the individual in social structural relations with others when structure is presented in group or macro terms (i.e. between men and women, and between different groups of men). We are consigned to thinking about power relations or macro social structures between groups, not local or micro level social structures that occur between specific individuals. This is known as the micro-macro divide, the chasm between macro and micro social structures (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). Importantly, Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994, p. 1444) “suggest that it is precisely through empirical social action – multiply determined, and undertaken by concretely situated actors – that these various analytical environments relate to one another”. So through attention to context we may begin to see how social structures are interdependent on cultural and individual factors, and how micro and macro structures may be related. It is therefore in context that interdependencies need to be articulated.

We now proceed to demonstrate interdependencies between structural, individual and cultural factors with relation to Connell’s theory. This is followed by attention to context and the applicability of social network analysis for its investigation. Finally, we outline a framework to examine Connell’s theory quantitatively.

The interdependency of structural, cultural, and individual factors in Connell’s theory

That structural, cultural and individual factors are interdependent in human social relations is an intuitively sensible concept, but theoretically difficult to conceptualise and quite often empirically troublesome to observe. The difficulty is not to see that structure, agency and culture are interdependent but in detailing how this is so. Interdependency is an ongoing and broader theoretical debate in the examination of human social relations (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Lindenberg, 1997) and so criticism is not restricted to Connell’s theory alone. But examining interdependency in Connell’s theory creates an opportunity to gain an enriched view of the theory and make the theory more defensible against other competing hypotheses. For the present we leave to one side the mutual dependencies between levels and focus specifically on the interdependencies between structural, cultural and individual factors in particular local settings.

Primarily, Connell (1987; 1995; 2002a) indicates that the objective of hegemonic masculinity is the legitimate dominance of men over women. Yet so far this systematic subordination of women has focused on the rewards it brings to men (i.e. the patriarchal dividend, Connell, 1995, 2002a). Examples are given of how men dominate cabinet positions in governments around the world and top positions in the corporate world, and are paid more than women on average (Connell, 2002a, pp. 1-2). These are important statistics. But it is also necessary to understand how men (and women) buy into and sustain such a system. The use of the term hegemony in *hegemonic masculinity* almost demands it, for central to

Gramsci's (1971) conception of hegemony is the use of ideology. At the most basic level, for any group to be dominated there must be a devaluation of that group by the other, and this devaluation, usually on the basis of some observed or inferred characteristic (eg. gender, ethnicity, religion, etc...), must be systematic. Therefore, the drive to dominance by men has to be due to a general belief that females are inferior and that males are superior. Connell asserts this with the notion of a belief by men of "supremacy" (Connell, 1995, p. 83). This ideology may not be fixed in strength or in the qualities it values in one group over the other, but beliefs in superiority must be present because it is the structuring principle of the macro relations of power between groups.

Brittan (1989) articulates this very point in arguing for a dual vision of men and power. Firstly, there is masculinity, which represents "those aspects of men's behaviour that fluctuate over time" (Brittan, 1989, p. 3). Secondly, there is masculinism.

Masculinism is the ideology that justifies and naturalises male dominance. As such, it is the ideology of patriarchy. Masculinism takes it for granted that there is a fundamental difference between men and women, it assumes that heterosexuality is normal, it accepts without question the sexual division of labour, and it sanctions the political and dominant role of men in the public and private spheres. (Brittan, 1989, p. 4)

Brittan suggests a strong connection between masculinity and masculinism. "Men collectively do not form committees to ensure their continued domination" (Brittan, 1989, pp. 5-6) but there is still some taken-for-granted aspect to men's power in relation to women. This distinction between masculinity and masculinism is useful, theoretically distinguishing the fluid expression of masculinity from those essential components that must be present for an ideology of male dominance. Brittan's (1989) 'masculinity' meets Connell's demand that gender is not a set of predefined psychological characteristics but is fluid and historically mobile. Yet 'masculinism' upholds a belief, conscious or unconscious, that men are superior to women. It is this belief that structures unequal gender relations. Brittan indicates how hegemonic masculinity can appear to change without fundamentally (structurally) changing by asserting a *fluidity* of attributes of gender but a (more) *stable* belief of the superiority of men over women. Importantly, masculinism points to what is missing from Whitehead's (2002) interpretation of Connell's theory of an ever-present structure of male domination. Masculinism justifies male dominance. Without justification, or, more correctly, with the replacement of this justification by a belief in other social relational patterns, structures of relations are likely to change.

The belief of the superiority of one group over another in order to justify unequal relations is a widely observable fact not restricted to gender, and there are a number of accepted theories that lend support to such intergroup relations. Ingroup/outgroup dynamics proposed by Sherif and colleagues (1988) posit that the perceived qualities and characteristics of the ingroup are more valued than those of the outgroup. More popularly, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the theoretically related self-categorization theory (Turner, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) are social psychological theories that endeavour to clarify group processes and intergroup relations. Such perspectives espouse that "self-enhancement is best achieved by the adoption of strategies that achieve or maintain a sense of in-group superiority relative to an out-group" (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002, p. 203). As such, "powerful people have a common interest in creating categories and stereotypes which are favourable to their power position and their social identity" such that "the powerful will develop and promulgate a dominant ideology" (Lindenberg, 1997, p. 304). Self-categorization theory details the process by which "people cognitively represent social groups in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a

subjective representation of the defining attributes (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, behaviours) of a social category, which is actively constructed from relevant social information in the immediate or more enduring interactive context” (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995, p. 261). Prototypes emphasise the similarities within and differences between categories, with those within the group resembling the prototype more liked or admired than those who do not fit the prototype.

Self-categorization theory hypothesizes that group polarization arises from an intra-group process of conformity to a polarized in-group norm, i.e. a norm more extreme than the mean of members’ initial opinions but in the same direction. It argues that the in-group norm is embodied in the prototypical response of members, which is not necessarily their average position. (McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992, p. 1)

The notion of a prototype (or ideal) may fit hegemonic masculinity well, as “hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly normative” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). In general, intergroup relations bring about the interesting interdependency between groups, “namely the possibility that the criteria for internal social approval are dependent on the external comparison” (Lindenberg, 1997, p. 322), a point noted by Demetriou (2001) with respect to Connell’s theory. Evident from social identity theory and self-categorization theory, and ingroup/outgroup dynamics of Sherif *et al* (1988), is that social structural relations between groups are mutually dependent upon shared cultural definitions of group qualities, which are of course mutually dependent on the qualities of individuals within these groups.

The dependency between beliefs and social relations is also articulated in social dominance orientation (SDO). In reference to defining groups “on the basis of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, religion, social class, region, skin color, clan, caste, lineage, tribe, minimal groups, or any other group distinction that the human mind is capable of constructing”, SDO “expresses general support for the domination of certain socially constructed groups over other socially constructed groups, regardless of the manner in which these groups are defined” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 61). SDO can provide information on the hierarchical dynamics of a society, and in consonance with Connell’s theory, Sidanius and Pratto present empirical evidence that “men, whites, and heterosexuals had higher SDO levels than women, blacks, Hispanics, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals” (1999, p. 77). “People’s general desire for positive self-esteem is compatible with hierarchy-legitimizing myths for people in high-status and dominant groups, making group superiority seem appropriate to them” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 77) because “the experience of having higher group status leads people to be more favourably oriented toward group dominance compared with having low group status” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 81).

All of the theories above propose that structural relations of power must be accompanied by a belief system that sees one group as superior or preferred to another. These beliefs are varied and contested. The general connection made from these perspectives is that ideology is related to an individual’s or group’s structural position of power, and that this relationship between ideology and structural position is seen as mutually reinforcing. The ramification for Connell’s theory is that male dominance ideology should vary as a function of one’s position in a set of power relations. This indicates interdependency between structural relations of power on the one hand and belief in the superiority of men over women on the other. This then is the first major proposition of our argument: that male dominance beliefs tend to be more strongly endorsed by those occupying more powerful positions in a hierarchy of masculinities.

Yet hegemony suggests something beyond the combination of personal belief and power relations, and as such culture is the third interdependent element that needs to be enunciated with regard to Connell's theory. In using the term culture we do not refer to ethnicity or cultural background, but instead "the customs, ideas, and social behaviour of a particular people or group" ("culture", The Concise Oxford English Dictionary) as they relate to how people interact in a *particular* local context, such as a workplace, club or family. In essence these are shared understandings of acceptable actions and behaviours in a particular setting.

Hegemony is a version of the world which is reality defining. Such versions are plural, inconsistent, achieved through discursive work, constantly needing to be brought into being over and over again. That is the chief character of hegemony rather than its definition as an already known and fixed set of ruling ideas. It is a relative position in a struggle for taken-for-grantedness. (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 352).

Culture has a prominent role with regard to hegemony. Gramsci (1971) argues that cultural beliefs attempt to naturalise position of power such that those in a hegemonic position define legitimate discourse, or push a version of reality onto others, through "the use of popular cultural construction" (Hall, 2002, p. 37). Others may resist and/or propose other perspectives, but those exercising most power may have an advantage by being able to change institutional policies or laws to suit their world views. Therefore, belief systems operate at both a collective and an individual level. We refer to belief at the collective level as cultural beliefs. Importantly cultural beliefs are not the sum total of all individual beliefs. Instead they refer to what people perceive as acceptable and appropriate. For example, an individual might personally believe that war is unjustified but perceive that most other people accept that it is. Certainly personal beliefs and collective, or cultural, beliefs are interdependent, but they are not the same thing.

Cultural formations are significant because they both constrain and enable historical actors, in much the same way as do network structures themselves. Cultural structures *constrain* actors, to begin with, by blocking out certain possibilities for action.... [and].... by preventing certain arguments from being articulated in public discourse or, once articulated, from being favourably interpreted by others or even understood..... But cultural formations also *enable* historical actors in diverse ways – for example, by ordering their understandings of the social world and of themselves, by constructing their identities, goals and aspirations, and by rendering certain issues significant or salient and others not. (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, pp. 1440-1441, emphasis in original)

Research on the cultural dimension of hegemonic masculinity discusses male homosocial environments as arenas where the interplay of personal masculinity must be negotiated with shared understandings of masculinity (Bird, 1996). Personal and shared understandings are not necessarily commensurate, and may vary over time and from individual to individual (Bird, 1996).

Masculinities that differ from the norm of hegemonic masculinity, however, are generally experienced as "private dissatisfactions" rather than foundations for questioning the social construction of gender..... Hegemonic masculinity persists, therefore, despite individual departures from the hegemonic form. (Bird, 1996, p. 123).

There are complex interdependencies between the individual and culture. Culture does not necessarily change what an individual believes, though it does have that capacity, but it may alter actual behaviour within a given context as a result of the individual's perceptions of the global "ideals", cultural

standards and group norms (Lyons & Kashima, 2003)¹. The wearing of suits in the workplace is an example of this. Many men and women wear suits not because it is their preference, though it might well be, but because there exists or they perceive there exists a work culture that expects it. Therefore, there is a separation of dominant cultural beliefs and the individual's belief about these same issues, and these may or may not be consonant. Hegemony asserts that collectively some beliefs are given more value than others, although such hegemony may be contested because individual and collective beliefs may differ. Individuals do not necessarily possess complete knowledge about the cultures in which they engage. Different levels of cultural knowledge result in different individual perceptions of what the prevailing culture is. It is at the level of individual cultural knowledge – the perceptions of the prevailing culture – that individuals are influenced.

A number of other theories and a range of empirical evidence also suggest that perceptions of cultural beliefs, especially in the form of norms, impact upon the individual. Social identity theory discusses the way in which perceptions of norms become shared and regulate individual and group identity formation, and group social structure.

Social identity is constructed and has its effects through a process of self-categorization that accentuates attitudinal, emotional, and behavioural similarity to the group prototype – one's cognitive representation of the features that best define the ingroup in the salient social comparative context. Self-categorization *depersonalizes* perception and conduct such that members, including oneself, are not processed as complex, multidimensional whole persons but, rather, as embodiments of the contextually salient perceived group prototype. (Hogg & Hains, 1998, p. 326)

Therefore, "ingroup members are liked not as unique individuals but as embodiments of the group – the more prototypical they are perceived to be, the more they are liked" (Hogg & Hains, 1998, p. 326). The prototype is a referent for people to judge themselves by constraining and also enabling people to act in certain ways. The notion of a prototype suggests that perceived norms are in the same direction but more extreme than the average of the group members' scores (McGarty et al., 1992). With respect to hegemonic masculinity, the presence of "a distance, and a tension, between collective ideal and actual lives" (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 592) indicates that perceived notions of masculinity are in fact more extreme than personal embodiment and belief. Resistance may be invoked by trying to redefine the prototype in one's favour (Hogg, 2001). As previously noted, other social psychological research indicates that shared understandings or perceived norms are known to individuals and created in the interests of the dominant group (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). All of these assertions suggest that personal attitudes are not necessarily commensurate with shared or group opinions, and that such group opinions are more likely to represent the dominant individual's or dominant group's own attitudes.

Yet while such assertions make sense, they overlook an equally important but unanswered question, and that is whether those in a hegemonic position believe that most others share their beliefs. The role of hegemony, as either leadership or domination, is to bring together people's beliefs so that they are commensurate with those of the dominant group. Certainly those in a hegemonic position are likely to

¹ It is apparent that we are taking a particular perspective of culture here. Of course there are other perspectives, such as anthropological perspectives, that assess cultural artefacts or ceremonies. However, the choice of a psychological position on culture stems from the interest in ideology, an integral element of hegemony. There are many other ways to conceptualise culture and we have chosen one that we feel is suited to the goals of our investigation. Here we are using each individual as an 'informant' about the local culture and taking their perceptions of the beliefs of others as their levels of 'cultural knowledge'. The use of culture here, and its measurement, is akin to the term *organizational culture*. It is particularly local and limited to the context under investigation, discussing shared understandings of acceptable actions and behaviours in a particular setting.

think that others *should* hold the same beliefs as themselves. But if we conceive of hegemony as constantly contested relations of power then those currently at the top are unlikely to think that all others share their views. It may be that this discrepancy makes the hegemonic group keen to continue power relations – to instil their personal beliefs in others, through leadership and/or through force. Indeed, it may be that this discrepancy is the driving force that led them to a position of hegemony in the first place.

Research on gender norms is enlightening on the way that cultural perceptions shape behaviour. Mahalik and colleagues (2003) discuss gender role norms as a benchmark by which all other masculinities are compared. “Gender role norms from the most dominant or powerful group in a society affect the experience of persons in that group, as well as persons in all other groups” such that “acceptance or rejection from the majority, in part, [is] based on adherence to the powerful group’s masculinity norms” (Mahalik et al., 2003, pp. 5-6). Further, in making reference to widely held cultural beliefs about gender, it is suggested that:

These abstracted, hegemonic understandings of men and women are roughly consensual in that virtually everyone in the society knows what they are and likely expects that most others hold these beliefs. Therefore, as individuals enter public settings that require them to define themselves in relation to others, *their default expectation is that others will treat them according to hegemonic gender beliefs*. In this way, these hegemonic beliefs act as the implicit rules of the gender game in public contexts. (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004, p. 513, emphasis added)

Both Mahalik *et al* (2003) and Ridgeway and Correll (2004) refer to the way in which gendered beliefs are (1) shared beliefs that are known to the individual and may influence the behaviour of the individual, and (2) are constructed in the interests of the dominant group but affect all members of a society. In this way, even for those who hold differing gender beliefs, “hegemonic gender beliefs are a stubborn part of a social reality that must be dealt with or accommodated in many contexts, even if they are not personally endorsed” (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004, p.514). For instance, because “norms of masculinity prescribe restricted emotionality for men, boys monitor their own and other boys’ emotional displays in order to suppress them” (Marecek, Crawford, & Popp, 2004, p. 195). This suggests a Foucauldian poststructuralist perspective of power that is strongly agentic, not focused on external power structures but on the ways in which individuals can restrain their own behaviour. In this sense, individuals are not merely at the whim of macrostructural power structures that impinge upon them from above. Sherif and colleagues (1988) found that in intergroup situations such as sporting competitions that non-participatory group members were often very hostile in their approaches to outgroups, more so than those competing ingroup members, but only if such behaviour was in line with the ingroup and the ingroup’s leader. In an interesting take on these issues, Lindenberg (1997, p. 306) suggests that “the influential people in a group are thus not those who can sanction or monitor behaviour but those who can provide information about the relevant stereotypes belonging to a social category”. Lindenberg is effectively stating that it is better to control people through their beliefs than by force, and those who determine cultural knowledge are in fact those who are most powerful. The interdependency between individual and socially shared beliefs is such that cultural beliefs do not determine individual beliefs, but they may influence them and be influenced by them.

Perceived cultural expectations play an enormous role in social life. Gender is not just the result of personal attributes and structures of social relations. Perceived cultural norms shape the behaviours of individuals in ways not directly related to individual and structural factors. Culture restricts the

articulation of alternatives because culture produces expectancy and naturalises certain relations while stigmatising others. Interdependency between culture and structural relations is clearly demonstrated in the public promotion of heterosexual relations and derogation of homosexual relations. Culture defines what is valued and individuals must negotiate their relation to these norms with others in public. This leads us to the second major proposition of our argument: that the perception of male dominance beliefs of others is important in sustaining a gender hierarchy. These perceptions of the beliefs of others represent the shared cultural dimension of our examination.

In summary, we have argued that interdependencies exist between structural, cultural, and individual factors with respect to Connell's theory. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) have suggested that it is through context that interdependencies become realised. Specific contexts differ in the individuals within them, and the qualities of such individuals, the varying social relations among such individuals, and shared cultural behavioural expectancies.

The legitimacy of hegemony

Hegemony refers to the pre-eminence of one social group over others and is based on *legitimate* relations of power. Therefore, a key concern in investigating hegemonic masculinity is the issue of legitimacy. Whitehead (2002) argues that no hegemony is a totality – there is always contestation. Similarly, Wetherell and Edley (1999) suggest that the desire for the hegemonic to be taken for granted and the hegemonic position normalised is an ongoing struggle. By stating that “like class relations, gender relations change historically, and the pattern and depth of hegemony changes also” (Connell, 2002b, p. 89), Connell suggests at times stronger and at other times weaker versions of gendered power relations may be present, and slightly different configurations may also be produced. In other words, there are degrees of legitimacy.

Yet Connell also suggests something about the structure of legitimate power relations that involves relationships between the groups of masculinities. It is interesting that Connell has been criticised for suggesting a distinctly dominative approach of hegemonic masculinity whereas others indicate, more in line with Gramsci's (1971) original conception, that hegemony involves constantly contested leadership (Demetriou, 2001; Howson, 2005), or the simultaneous presence of dominance and resistance (Mumby, 1997). At issue is an understanding of how power is exercised and contested, and thereby the legitimacy of hegemony. In our view, Connell articulates power as operating as a combination of leadership and domination. This is evident in the titles given to two of the configurations of masculinity – complicit and subordinate. The word *complicit* hardly speaks of being dominated, unlike the term *subordinate*. Instead, complicity speaks of alliance. So in a given context both leadership and domination occur – hegemonic masculinity *illegitimately* dominates subordinate masculinity while simultaneously and *legitimately* leading complicit masculinity. What differentiates these styles of hegemony is the perceived legitimacy of power relations.

In our view, hegemonic masculinity sets up a positive relationship with complicit masculinity while simultaneously constructing a negative relation with subordinate masculinity. The acceptance of a particular characterization of masculinity is therefore dependent on the rejection of another because the hegemonic form of masculinity is defined by what it *is not* as much as what it *is* (Connell, 1995; Davies, 1993). The rejection of one form of masculinity thereby gives legitimacy or authority to another form. Appropriate behaviours, beliefs or views are differentiated from inappropriate ones by having a reference

group to vilify.

In some ways such a set of relations with regard to alliance represents a balanced triad from Heider's (1958) balance theory or Cartwright and Harary's (1956) structural balance theory. Such a conception is presented in Figure 1, with **H** representing *hegemonic masculinity*, **C** for *complicit masculinity* and **S** for *subordinate masculinity*.




Figure 1: Alliance in Connell's theory - a balanced triad (“+” refers to allied relations, “-” refers to antagonistic relations)

It is the alliance with complicit masculinity – the majority of men – that ultimately provides general legitimacy for hegemonic masculinity. By denigrating subordinate masculinity, hegemonic masculinity asserts its superiority and achieves legitimate rule. In this sense, hegemonic masculinity must convince complicit masculinity that subordinate masculinity is illegitimate, thus setting itself up as legitimate. Our goal now is to outline what would be seen for a reasonably legitimate hierarchy for hegemonic masculinity if Connell's theory were to hold. We suggest that two key factors are associated with legitimacy: emotion and violence.

Emotion and legitimate hegemony

Emotion is crucial to understanding an ideological endorsement of power, and lies at the heart of legitimacy. While we have suggested that support for Connell's theory would be found if a large proportion of men who were seen as powerful held stronger beliefs in the superiority of men, this is not enough to explain *legitimate* hegemony. In essence, it is one thing to acknowledge the presence of power relations but it is another to believe they are justified. Hall (2002, p. 37) indicates that hegemony as a belief system incorporates an emotional component. Indeed, emotion is incorporated into Connell's theory as a dimension of gender referred to as cathexis, or emotional attachment, which among other things regulates desire by embracing heterosexuality and denigrating homosexuality (Connell, 1995, 2002a). Sexuality becomes a strongly held belief tied in with emotion, with certain practices valued as “natural”, “ordinary”, and “normal” (Donaldson, 1993, p. 645) which of course results in negative emotion for other sexuality practices which are viewed as *unnatural*, *unusual* and *abnormal*. But it is the strength of emotion in these beliefs that regulates these practices, in ways that are not seen with respect to littering or double-parking (in Australia at least). In social psychology the linking of attitudes with emotions, behaviours and cognitions is widely studied (Carlson & Buskist, 1997). Festinger (1957) proposed the notion of cognitive dissonance, which refers to the discrepancy which may occur between attitudes and behaviour, behaviour and self-esteem, or between attitudes, which produces *feelings of anxiety*, or dissonance, that the individual attempts to reduce. Further, social identity theory posits a drive for positive social identity “is underpinned by a basic human need for positive self-esteem” (Hogg, 2001,

p. 187). To view particular beliefs and their associated social relations as worthwhile, one must believe in their value – people must emotionally endorse them. Therefore, legitimate social relations and beliefs occur where people invest emotionally in them such that these relations are viewed positively. We would therefore expect that positive affect relations would replicate the relations of power.

Conversely, the perception of illegitimate power relations is likely to be associated with negative emotion, and this speaks to the notion of resistance. Resistance may come from subordinates who wish to enhance “their self-esteem through downward comparison, upward mobility, or social change” (Lindenberg, 1997, p. 304). Subordinate masculinities are likely to view hegemonic masculinity with some negative emotion, and it is likely that this is reciprocated. However, resistance may also come from marginalized masculinities in the form of protest masculinities (Connell, 1995, 2000). In research on leadership it is suggested that because they are less prototypical than majorities, “minorities will find it more difficult to achieve and maintain an effective leadership role” (Hogg, 2001, p. 194). It is likely that social minorities will not simply accept such difficulties but adopt strategies to redefine the situation to achieve their goals, and this is consonant with Connell’s theory of marginalized masculinities contesting power. Resistance to hegemonic masculinity may therefore appear in various guises. Some may put forward the alternate ideologies, others may try to out-do the current system. For hegemonic masculinity to be seen as legitimate within a hierarchy of masculinities we would expect to see hegemonic and subordinate masculinities express strong negative affect toward one another. That is, individuals with very different male dominance beliefs will be more likely to feel negatively toward one another.

Violence and legitimate hegemony

The role of violence is complex in gender relations. Connell states that “violence is a part of a system of domination, but it is also a measure of its imperfection. A thoroughly legitimate hierarchy would have less need to intimidate” (Connell, 1995, p. 84). So violence is a mechanism for the enforcement or maintenance of power and a measure of its illegitimacy (Connell, 1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, violence can also be used to contest power (Connell, 1995, 2000). It is important to note that violence is not power, but it can bring power, just as ideology can bring power. The relation of violence with male dominance beliefs would be expected to mirror, not replicate, those of power through ideology. In a hierarchy where hegemonic masculinity as outlined by Connell is reasonably supported, it would be expected that violence relations would be primarily from hegemonic to subordinate masculinity as a means of hegemony enforcement. Where resistance takes place, violence may come from subordinate masculinity, or from marginalized masculinities. But in the main, we expect violence to come from hegemonic masculinity and be used maintain its dominant position.

The third major proposition of our argument is that legitimation (or alliance) and/or contestation can be examined through the patterns of positive and negative affect, and also through violence, among individuals in an instantiated local context, and that we expect both legitimation and contestation to occur simultaneously.

Context in Connell’s theory

“One cannot understand social life without understanding the arrangements of particular social actors in particular social times and places” (Abbott, 1997, p. 1152).

The Chicago writers believed social structure to be a set of temporary stabilities in a process of flux and reciprocal determination. The social world was made up of actors mutually determining each other in ways sometimes deliberate and sometimes quite unforeseen. But the cornerstone of the Chicago vision was location, for location in social time and space channelled the play of reciprocal determination. All social facts were also located within the temporal logic of one or more processes of succession, assimilation, conflict, and so on. This meant that the Chicago vision was of a social structure embedded in a time, a structure in process. (Abbott, 1997, pp. 1157-1158)

Connell notes the need for context, to gain an understanding of what sustains or maintains gendered power relations, as well as how they may be subverted, and how the system as a whole fits together. Connell indicates that “there is generally a hegemonic form of masculinity, the most honoured or desired in a particular context” (Connell, 1998, p. 5) and that masculinities are “configurations of practice generated in particular situations” (Connell, 1995, p. 81). Further, Connell and colleagues note that “it is clear that the pattern that is hegemonic in one institution is not automatically so in another” (Kessler, Ashenden, Connell, & Dowsett, 1985, p. 44). This leads Jefferson (2002, p. 71) to the assumption that “the theory does suggest multiple, context-specific strategies”, an assumption echoed by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005). But “local plurality is compatible with singularity of hegemonic masculinity at the regional or society-wide level” such that “the ‘family resemblance’ among local variants is likely to be represented by one symbolic model at the regional level, not by multiple models” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, pp. 850-851). So although Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, p. 839) assert that “at the local level, hegemonic patterns of masculinity are embedded in specific social environments”, they link up with a singular regional pattern.

More generally, Connell defines context by asserting a number of levels for the theory. These levels are essentially different contextual frameworks within which gender is enacted.

Adopting an analytical framework that distinguishes local, regional, and global masculinities (and the same point applies to femininities) allows us to recognise the importance of place without falling into a monadic world of totally independent cultures or discourses. (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 850)

It is now time to return to the issue of interdependency between the levels of Connell’s theory. Local settings, or *gender regimes*, are the “regular set of arrangements about gender” found in an institution, such as school or work, corresponding to the “usual feature of organisational life” (Connell, 2002a, p. 53). Local settings are the level of analysis “constructed in the arenas of face-to-face interaction of families, organizations, and immediate communities, as typically found in ethnographic and life-history research” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849). These local settings, or gender regimes, “are part of wider patterns” known as the “*gender order* of a society” (Connell, 2002a, p. 54), or the “regional” setting (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849), which “endure over time” (Connell, 2002a, p. 54). Regional settings are thus defined at the level of the nation-state. “The gender regimes of institutions usually correspond to the overall gender order, but may depart from it. This is important for change” (Connell, 2002a, p. 54). Therefore, change may occur in one local setting though these modifications may take time to filter into other local settings. Additionally, if a number of local settings change then this may affect the societal *gender order*, the regional level of gender relations. Beyond regional settings Connell indicates that there is also a larger structure of gender relations. “The world gender order can be defined as the structure of relationships that interconnect the gender regimes of institutions, and the gender orders of local societies, on a world scale” (Connell, 2003, p. 255). This world

gender order is the global setting, indicative of “world politics and transnational business and media” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849). It is reasonable to assume that the levels or settings of the theory do not just operate in a top-down fashion, and Connell and Messerschmidt indicate as much (2005, p. 850). There is a flow from one level to the other, which is implied in the term interdependency.

Local settings are particularly interesting due to criticisms that Connell’s theory has difficulty in locating the individual within larger group practices (Jefferson, 2002; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Whitehead, 2002). Individual gender performances are much more apparent in local settings than in regional or global settings. It is in local settings that personal resistance and personal reinforcement of gender relations can occur, though these local settings are indubitably linked to regional and global settings.

Yet local settings need to be more precisely defined. It is possible to think of local settings in two ways: firstly, as a general concept, referring collectively to any or all settings in a society, or to a type of setting, such as schools, or workplaces, or state institutions, or subtypes of institutions, such as transnational corporations, or all institutions collectively; and secondly, local settings can be thought of in reference to a single specific setting, such as the small government school at the end of the street with the high brick wall. The first definition encompasses an abstract institutional concept, though is also able to differentiate types of regimes from one another. The second definition, on which we will focus, makes reference to a specific, single context. We refer to the former definition as the *general local setting* and the latter, specific context as an *instantiated local setting* to highlight this important distinction.

For instance, schools, in general, have common properties that allow them to be discussed together. However, each school has its own characteristics such as size, location, culture, focus, geography and the type of people that attend it, and as such students negotiate all of these in particular ways. So just as differing general local settings can vary from one another (such as workplaces from families), so can their instantiations. As an example, a boy in a school is likely to compare himself to the particular types of gender relations and masculinities in the specific school he attends (which could be more sporty or more academically inclined or disinclined as the case may be), to other local settings (other schools), to the regional gender practices, and then to the gender practices of a global setting. But this boy is also likely to utilise other local settings as referents, such as the family, or sporting institutions, or part-time work settings. This indicates that there are not just interdependencies across levels, but within them as well.

The distinction between general and specific local settings facilitates a move to a local level investigation which incorporates specific individuals, the relations between them, and the cultural guidelines that go with the particular context. In practice, empirical studies already engage instantiated local settings. The point is that specific local settings need to be theoretically stipulated to enable a foothold on the unresolved, complex interdependencies between and within local, regional and global settings. The fourth and final major proposition underpinning our argument is that Connell’s theory can be investigated empirically by examining instantiated local settings through specific hypotheses that express expected forms of interdependency between individual, structural and cultural factors.

With a general theoretical articulation of Connell’s theory in place, we now introduce social network analysis as a methodology for examining such assertions.

Examining local contexts using social network analysis

Context is dealt with extremely well in life history research² as an understanding can be given of the individual and their world in which they interact with others. Life histories focus on subjective experience in historical situations and provide a window onto “social structures, social movements and institutions” (Connell, 1995, p. 89). Connell notes that as a technique life history is wonderfully rich in detail, though suggests its associated ‘cost’ is that it is time-consuming. “Using it to study large-scale social change requires a trade-off between depth and scope. A life-history study of masculinity, for instance, cannot sample a broad population of men while gaining any depth of understanding of particular situations” (Connell, 1995, pp. 89-90). Yet there are other ways to look at context. Context as personal and temporal in regards to an individual’s perspective of the world and their place in it is quite different from context as a specific setting that involves a number of people and their interrelations. Here, we are specifically concerned with social context rather than personal context, though the two are obviously related.

In standard quantitative research, context can be rather problematic. Abbott (1997) notes the shift in the 1930s in sociology which was helped by “the makers of the new variables revolution [who] saw that by removing social facts from their immediate contexts one could make them accessible to the power of the new inferential statistics” (Abbott, 1997, p. 1163). The introduction of market research and opinion polling also assisted this shift by focusing on ‘what’ people did and completing discounting the ‘why’, primarily because consumer tastes would change before an understanding of their choices was uncovered. A split occurred in sociology that conflated “on the one hand objectivism, quantitative study, and variable-based approaches and on the other subjectivism, qualitative study, and case-based approaches” (Abbott, 1997, p. 1161).

The necessary decontextualization of particular social attributes was then accomplished through the rapidly advancing discipline of sampling, which not only separated individuals from their social context of friends, acquaintances, and so on, but also deliberately ignored an individual *variable’s* context of other variables in the name of achieving “more complete” knowledge of the variable space. Sampling not only tamed contextual effects to mere interactions, it also thereby produced data sets in which the levels of contextual causation were deliberately minimized. This would later enable a whole generation of sociologists to act as if interaction were a methodological nuisance rather than the way social reality happens. (Abbott, 1997, p. 1162: emphasis in original)

Fundamentally, interdependency is the mechanism by which context is produced³. Interdependency articulates the relations between social structures, individual attributes and cultural norms of people in a social setting. Context can be seen as the specific configuration of these interdependencies. Decontextualization, as produced by sampling above, removes interdependency and asserts that individuals are isolated social units who behave in consistent ways regardless of externalities of other individuals or circumstances. By eradicating interdependency, social structures and cultural expectations are seen to have either no effect on the individual or are internalised by individuals as a consistent effect regardless of situation. Removing interdependency certainly helps to meet the assumption of statistical tests involving independent observations, but may not be that helpful for understanding human social relations. To examine Connell’s theory quantitatively using standard statistical apparatus is problematic given the need to consider context and interdependency. A relational

² Life history research is a qualitative research method similar to case study or ethnography whereby the researcher probes at how individuals understand their world and make sense of their experiences in it.

³ Of course, it is also possible to have generalized interdependencies that apply across contexts.

theory such as Connell's would be well served by a relational methodology, one that could measure the relations *between* individuals.

Social network analysis

The term *social network* can be moved beyond use as a metaphor of the social world and implemented as a specific, local-level relational methodology (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). This methodology is known as social network analysis (SNA) and by formal definition is a set of techniques that focus on the "*relationships* among social entities, and on the patterns and implications of these relationships" (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 3). Social network analysis had its origins in the 1930s in work by Moreno in sociometry (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), though the use of the term is often attributed to Barnes (1954). "The unit of analysis in network analysis is not the individual, but an entity consisting of a collection of individuals and the linkages among them" (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 5). Therefore, "a social network is one of many possible sets of social relations of a specific context – for example, communicative, power, affectual, or exchange relations – that links actors within a larger social structure (or network of networks)" (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p. 1417). In a social network, individuals (or actors) are represented as nodes in a graph, and the relations between them are represented as edges or lines. Additionally, personal level variables can be incorporated so that structural and individual factors can be investigated together within a social network (Robins, Elliott, & Pattison, 2001; Robins, Pattison, & Elliott, 2001). By way of important recent developments (Snijders, Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006) complex social structures can also be examined. One of the major advantages that a social network methodology has over common statistical analyses is that it does not make the assumption of independent observations.

Both theory and practice indicate that such micro social relations are extremely important. Theoretically, the triadic relations of Simmel (1950) and Heider's (1958) balance theory provide explanations of how people are enabled and constrained in their everyday social relations with others. Simmel (1950) asserted the importance of triadic relations where two people may be connected to one another through a third person. For example, a child not only has a relation with her grandmother directly, but also indirectly through her mother. Following Heider (1958), Cartwright and Harary (1956) introduced structural balance theory, applying balance concepts to such triadic relations. For example, if Tom indicates that Ali is his friend, and Ali indicates that Suresh is his friend, then to balance the situation Tom may also select Suresh as a friend, thereby creating a transitive triad. It is at this micro level that we find individuals, and thus locate everyday gender expressions, performances and relations. The patterns of these relations, however, can be examined more broadly across the context in which they take place, thus in a wider patterns of social relations.

Basic social network terminology

It is necessary to introduce some social network terminology. In general terms, a social network is a bounded set of individuals (e.g. all of the people in a particular workplace) and a measure of some specific relation between them (e.g. 'who you seek advice from'). More formally, a social network N consists of the relations between a set of g actors. For example, in a network consisting of 'advice' relations, X is defined as the associated sociomatrix, which consists of g rows and g columns (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, Chapter 3). With five actors the $g \times g$ sociomatrix becomes a 5×5 sociomatrix, which is

represented in Panel A, Figure 2 below. When a relation or tie is present between two actors in a network this is denoted by $X_{ij}=1$, referring to a nomination from the actor in row i to the actor in column j . The absence of a tie is represented as $X_{ij}=0$. Actors i and j refer theoretically to any and all pairs of actors within the network. In a *directed* network the direction of the relation is important. For the ‘advice’ network measure, $X_{ij}=1$ indicates that actor i goes to actor j for advice, whereas $X_{ji}=0$ indicates that actor j does not go to actor i for advice. In Panel A, Figure 2 the diagonal values of the sociomatrix are empty as in this example individuals are precluded from seeking advice from themselves, though in other types of networks such relations may be sensible and could be incorporated. It is possible to represent the sociomatrix in graphical form (as in Panel B, Figure 2). This provides a more visual and easily interpretable representation of the relations between people in a social network.




Figure 2: (Panel A): A 5 x 5 sociomatrix of ‘advice’ seeking, and (Panel B): A graph showing the same social relations

The dots (nodes) represent individuals, and the arrow-headed lines indicate to whom an individual goes for advice. It is also common in social network analysis to refer to individuals as senders and receivers of ties. In Figure 2 Panel B, individual ‘1’ is a sender of a tie, and individual ‘2’ is a receiver of a tie.

Applying a social network approach to Connell’s theory

A good place to begin with the application of social network analysis to Connell’s macrostructural gender relations is between the internal components of masculinity (i.e. hegemonic, complicit and subordinate masculinities). Of specific importance here is the assertion that belief may vary with a structural position of power, though it is not useful to think of the relation between belief and social structure as deterministic. However, to represent the macrostructural relations between Connell’s different internal masculinities, we suggest that those men embodying hegemonic masculinity would most strongly endorse male dominance ideology and also be seen as the most powerful men. Conversely, subordinate men are least likely to endorse male dominance beliefs, and are least likely to be seen as powerful by others. Complicit men would sit somewhere in between on both attitudes and relations of power. The relationships between these categories of men are represented in diagrammatic form in Figure 3. The different configurations of masculinity are presented such that **H** represents hegemonic masculinity, **C** represents complicit masculinity, and **S** represents subordinate masculinity. The arrowed

lines represent power relations between the groups with the arrowhead pointing toward those considered powerful, and a circular arrow indicating self-nomination.




Figure 3: Macrostructural power relations in Connell's theory: Internal components of masculinity

Figure 3 indicates that subordinate masculinity sees hegemonic masculinity as powerful, but also sees complicit masculinity as powerful. Complicit masculinity sees hegemonic masculinity as powerful. Finally, hegemonic masculinity sees itself as powerful. However, Figure 3 is a macrostructural representation of Connell's theory, and as such it is still a representation of the relations between groups of men when we have argued for the need to study relations between individuals. The next step is to move beyond this global representation and to express it in local terms. But this raises a fundamental question of whether to expect the local to exactly replicate the global. For example, a very strong version of Connell's theory would assert that within a particular local setting *all* males are subject to *all* aspects of the regime in their experienced lives. Therefore, all males in a given context would be involved in triads of the type represented in Figure 3. In contrast, in a more relaxed version of the theory, it would be possible for a hegemonic structure to emerge if only some individuals were involved in power relations but that overall the structure reflected those of Figure 3. In other words, there may be some scope for a level of defection by some individuals from the effects of the regime. However, if such scope does not exist then there is a highly deterministic structure in which all males (and females) are subject to all of its strictures without exception.

A less strict interpretation of Connell's theory is presented in Figure 4. By magnifying the overall macrostructural relations, it is possible to view individuals within the broader patterns of relations, and they can be seen as black nodes, each assigned a letter. Figure 4 indicates that not every individual is involved in nominations of power but that when nominations do occur they follow the broader patterns of the macrostructures of Connell's theory shown in Figure 3. Therefore, actors x , y and z in Figure 4 are not part of any power relations. However, a nomination of power from actor t to actor f (i.e. $X_t = 1$) is in consonance with the categorical configuration of $S \rightarrow H$ of Figure 3, fitting the general macrostructure predicted in Figure 3. Other ties, such as from actor j to k , support the $C \rightarrow H$ global configuration; the tie from actor i to w supports the $S \rightarrow C$ configuration; and finally the nomination from k to t represents the $H \rightarrow H$ configuration. In some sense the categorization of individuals into H , S and C categories is like assigning attributes to individuals, such that there are high, medium and low endorsements of male dominance beliefs. An important implication of moving from a deterministic conceptualisation represented by Figure 3 to a more nuanced version in Figure 4 is a claim of stochasticism that ultimately will require a statistical analysis.




Figure 4: Including the individual in the macrostructural power relations of Connell’s theory

However, there are still difficulties to overcome with the approach in Figure 4 as a representation of Connell’s theory. Assigning individuals into a category suggests that people within the categories are equivalent when clearly they may differ in their endorsement of male dominance beliefs. For instance, actors *k*, *t* and *x* may hold different male dominance beliefs even though they are in the same category of high male dominance beliefs. We suggest that a categorical approach can be replaced by one that treats beliefs in male dominance as a continuous variable. Figure 5 shows such an interpretation of Connell’s theory. Individual endorsement of male dominance ideology is represented by the size of the node such that larger nodes represent more strongly held male dominance beliefs. The information of the categorical boundaries has been retained in the diagram to demonstrate the link between the categorical and continuous approach, though the saliency of the category boundaries has been lessened by making them grey to show that they are no longer part of the conceptualisation.




Figure 5: Including the individual in the macrostructural power relations of Connell’s theory using a continuous-scale measure of male dominance beliefs

Figure 5 demonstrates variation in an endorsement of male dominance beliefs within categories, permitting a more detailed understanding of differences in endorsement of male dominance beliefs between individuals. For instance, the nomination from actor *k* to *t* in a categorical model in Figure 3 indicates a tie between actors equivalent in their male dominance beliefs, which would be considered no different to a tie in the reverse direction from *t* to *k*. In the continuous model in Figure 5 it is clear that actor *t* holds a stronger male dominance belief than actor *k*, and so the nomination from actor *k* to *t* is not equivalent to a nomination from *t* to *k*. It is this shift from a categorical to a continuous account that begins to break down the notion of groups of masculinities, instead focusing on the relations between individuals and their individual, not group, beliefs.

To further simplify the nominations of power between actors in Figure 5 it is possible to examine the pattern of dyadic relations. The nominations of power made in the network shown in Panel A of Figure 6 are replicated in Panel B of Figure 6 as pairs of actors (dyads). In Panel B of Figure 6 the nominations of power follow the pattern of senders of power relations holding smaller male dominance beliefs and receivers holding larger male dominance beliefs. Essentially, Connell’s macrostructural hierarchy of masculinities can be examined as dyadic relations between pairs of individuals within a social context. But it is only proper to do so within a network model that takes into account the structural interdependencies among the observations. Otherwise we are left with an implausible dyadic independence model. The point is that the sender and receiver effects in Panel B may be seen as hypotheses, controlling for other structural regularities. The dyads in Panel B are all consistent with our first hypothesis: that individuals at the top of the hierarchy (i.e. those more likely to be recognized as powerful, “receivers” of nominations) are more likely to hold stronger male dominance beliefs; and conversely those lower down the hierarchy (i.e. “senders”) are more likely to hold weaker male dominance beliefs.




Figure 6: Power relations and the personally held male dominance beliefs of individuals in (A) network form and in (B) dyadic relations form

In Figure 7 we present how individuals might perceive the male dominance beliefs of others in the network. As with personal beliefs, the relations of Panel B, Figure 7 can be articulated as dyadic relations. These dyadic relations are consistent with our second hypothesis, that the perception of the dominance beliefs of others is important in a hierarchy of masculinities.




Figure 7: Power relations and the perceived male dominance beliefs of individuals in (A) network form and in (B) dyadic relations form

What we have presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7 and the associated ties is an illustration of how our first two major propositions might be exemplified if Connell's theory is correct. In summary, we can elaborate these hypotheses as four main effects that we might expect to see in a social network of power relations:

[1] Individuals with *low* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* power ties.

[2] Individuals with *high perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* power ties.

[3] Individuals with *high* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* power ties.

[4] Individuals with *low perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* power ties.

It is important to note that assertions [1] and [4] do not suggest that *all* senders have such characteristics (such as low personal male dominance beliefs and high perceived beliefs) and that *all* receivers have different characteristics (i.e. high personal male dominance beliefs and low perceived male dominance beliefs). Individuals with high personal male dominance beliefs and low perceived male dominance can still send ties, and individuals with low personal male dominance beliefs and high perceived male dominance beliefs can still receive ties. The point is that across the network as a whole may be a *substantial tendency* for effects [1] to [4] to hold in comparison to other patterns of ties among individuals. These four main effects are simply distillations from Connell's theory. They do not represent the entirety of the theory but we would expect to see at least these effects in a local context where Connell's theory applies. Yet these four assertions bring together interdependencies between structural, individual and cultural factors with regard to power relations in Connell's theory. The *structural* power relations are interdependent with *individual* beliefs of male dominance, both of which are interdependent with perceived *cultural* norms, or group opinions, relating to male dominance beliefs. It is not one or two of these elements that explain hegemony, but the combination and interdependency of all three, that explains how power operates.

The legitimacy of hegemony

As noted, a second level of analysis involves how the legitimacy of such power relations can be examined. We suggest that emotion and violence are factors associated with legitimate power relations. Firstly, for emotion, the balancing of emotion in Connell's theory was presented in Figure 1. In this diagram it is the combination of negative and positive affect relations that provide a balanced triadic structure of emotion, with *positive affect* between hegemonic and complicit masculinities, *negative affect* between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, and *negative affect* between complicit and subordinate masculinities. Firstly, for positive emotion, it is not just that some people should be viewed as powerful, but that they should also be viewed positively. As such, we argue that if the patterns of relationships replicate the main effects for power relations, we have some evidence for a situation of legitimate hegemony. Therefore, evidence for legitimation would occur if the following statements were supported with respect to positive affect ties:

[1] Individuals with *low* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* positive affect ties.

[2] Individuals with *high perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* positive affect ties.

[3] Individuals with *high* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* positive affect ties.

[4] Individuals with *low perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* positive affect ties.

Yet legitimate rule is also sustained through negative affect because of the intention of discrediting certain configurations of masculinity. Primarily we suggest that hegemonic masculinity and subordinate masculinity are most likely to hold negative affect for one another. Hegemonic masculinity solidifies its power through negative affect for subordinate masculinity, and subordinate masculinity contests power via negative affect for negative affect for hegemonic masculinity. However, the combination of the positive affect held more generally for hegemonic masculinity with bi-directed negative affect shows overall support and legitimation for hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, it is expected that there will be negative emotion in both directions between individuals who hold large differences in their male dominance beliefs. Accordingly:

[1] Individuals with considerably different male dominance beliefs are more likely to both express negative affect ties to and receive such ties from one another.

[2] Individuals with considerably different *perceived* male dominance beliefs are more likely to both send negative affect ties to and receive such ties from one another.

There are some important points to note here to clarify the role of negative and positive emotion. In some senses the positive and negative affect predicted relations seem at odds with one another. However, it is important to remember that the predictions are not about specific individuals. Indeed, those engaging in positive affect relations need not necessarily be the same people who engage in negative affect relations.

Finally, violence is also a measure of the legitimacy of power relations. Violence can be used to enforce power but also be used to contest power. If hegemonic masculinity is seen to have support, we would expect violence mainly from those in the hegemonic position, who most strongly support male dominance beliefs, to those in a subordinate position who least support male dominance beliefs. If there was considerable resistance we would most likely see these patterns reversed. Therefore, with regard to violence relations, the specific hypotheses are articulated as such that on average:

[1] Individuals with *high* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* ties (be violent towards others).

[2] Individuals with *low perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *send* ties (be violent towards others).

[3] Individuals with *low* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* ties (be victims of violence).

[4] Individuals with *high perceived* male dominance beliefs will have a greater tendency to *receive* ties (be victims of violence).

Individuals with high male dominance beliefs will be violent towards individuals with low male

dominance beliefs [1], both in part because they see most other individuals have low male dominance beliefs [3] but also because they perceive most others in the local setting hold low male dominance beliefs [2]. The cultural beliefs of those receiving violence relations are very important in this instance, for if violence is effective then those who suffer violence should perceive most others around them hold high male dominance beliefs [4].

Local social structures and marginalized masculinities

It is important to control for other effects that may be related to the formation of social relations. We have previously mentioned transitive triads as a structuring principle of human social relations – for example, a friend of a friend is a friend. Reciprocity, or the tendency for people to mutually agree to the presence of a relation between them, is a further structural effect. Such structural effects are not seen as dependent upon individual attributes, but are purely structural regularities that are commonly witnessed in social relations (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). We cannot suppose such structural dependencies can be fully explained by the effects we hypothesise from Connell's theory, and to ignore them is to revert to independent observations (at the dyadic level). These patterned local social structures are not part of Connell's theory, nor should they be, for Connell's is not a theory of local social structures. However, such structures need to be taken into account and controlled for in our analyses, because they offer competing hypotheses for why power or other social relations are formed. For example, in examining three individuals in a hypothetical transitive triad of power relations, it is not clear whether a particular power relationship between from one individual to another is the result of transitivity, reciprocity, or because of some attribute of the individuals (for instance, male dominance beliefs). All three reasons for the power relation are equally plausible. But by examining all power relations within a particular social network it is possible to see if, across the network more generally, there are patterns to the nomination of power relations. These patterns can provide information about which is the more likely explanation for power relations across the network.

There are also factors such as SES and ethno-cultural background, which Connell (1995) has suggested are indicative of marginalized masculinities, that need to be taken into account in understanding the formation of social relations. A social network approach permits such factors to be included in our analyses to determine how they are associated with social relations of interest. We have left theorizing on the issues of marginalization to one side because they depend considerably on local context and it is not central, though certainly important, to Connell's articulation of masculinities. Importantly, including SES and ethno-culture as individual-level parameters allows for an investigation of marginalized masculinities along with hegemonic and other masculinities. The inclusion of such factors within social network analyses will permit us to investigate if such factors are significantly related to the sending or receiving of social ties.

Conclusion

Our theoretical discussion of Connell's theory suggests that an examination of hegemonic and other masculinities in local settings is necessarily limited by two crucial issues: (1) the interdependency between structural, individual and cultural factors, and (2) a conceptualisation of local context within which masculinities take place. Connell's theory has been presented predominantly in macrostructural terms, coupled with in-depth life histories. While both are informative, we also need a tangible

connection between the macro power relations and the individual experience of masculinity. We have attempted to specify the interdependencies of structural, individual and cultural factors, and more acutely defined contexts within which they may occur to produce some straightforward hypotheses that are amenable to empirical examination.

It is clear that our particular approach is by no means the only way to understand Connell's theory. We offer it as a first approximation of how we might potentially utilise the useful insights that the theory proposes using social network analysis. Our immediate goal then is to examine masculinity within a specific local context, examining social interactions between individuals, individual attributes and shared cultural values. Our hypotheses can be examined empirically using a particular class of statistical models for social networks. Originally developed by Frank and Strauss (1986), Wasserman and Pattison (1996), Pattison and Wasserman (1999) and Robins, Pattison and Wasserman (1999), these statistical models for social networks are referred to as exponential random graph (p^*)⁴ models. Recent derivations of these models have the capacity to examine both individual level variables and structural relations together (Robins, Elliott et al., 2001; Robins, Pattison et al., 2001). The new specifications for such models allow for the examination of complex, higher order social structures (Snijders et al., 2006). Using a statistical model it is possible to test competing hypotheses for social tie formation, such as local structural structures, beliefs in male dominance, SES or ethno-cultural background. Therefore, exponential random graph models can control for these different variables and permit the researcher to make inferences about the independent contribution of each variable across the network as a whole. A number of detailed introductory texts to exponential random graph (p^*) models are available for a more detailed account of the capabilities of such statistical models for social networks (Contractor, Wasserman, & Faust, 2006; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & Lusher, in press).

Three tasks lie ahead in an empirical exposition of Connell's theory using an exponential random graph modelling framework. Firstly, we must be able to conceptualise and measure an ideology of male dominance at the level of the individual, both as personal endorsement and perceived cultural norm. Secondly, we must be able to conceive and measure structural relations of power, violence and affect between individuals. Thirdly, we need to assert a specific context within which to examine these issues, which obviously has implications for the aforementioned methodological concerns. These endeavours are taken up in two companion papers, one on measurement of male dominance beliefs (Lusher, Robins, & Dudgeon, in preparation) and one in which we empirically examine Connell's theory using social network analysis (Lusher & Robins, in preparation).

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⁴ Read "p-star"

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